A Tear in the Corporate Veil: The Liability of Corporate Officers for Patent Infringement by Sauer, Joseph M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 37 Number 1 Article 5 
1998 
A Tear in the Corporate Veil: The Liability of Corporate Officers for 
Patent Infringement 
Joseph M. Sauer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph M. Sauer, A Tear in the Corporate Veil: The Liability of Corporate Officers for Patent Infringement, 
37 Duq. L. Rev. 89 (1998). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol37/iss1/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
A-Tear in the Corporate Veil: The Liability of
Corporate Officers for Patent Infringement
INTRODUCTION
Corporate officers are wise to use extra caution when maling
decisions that might result in patent infringement. Generally, a
corporate officer, acting in his or her official capacity, may only
incur personal liability for torts committed by his or her corpora-
tion either under the principles of agency or by piercing the corpo-
rate veil.1 However, when the corporation commits patent in-
fringement the traditional principles do not always apply. This pe-
culiarity of patent law is the result of the broad definition of in-
fringement as set forth in the Patent Act of 1952.2
Before 1952, the federal appellate courts, applying general theo-
ries of corporate law, did not often find corporate officers person-
ally liable for patent infringement.' Most jurisdictions only held a
corporate officer personally liable if (1) he committed the in-
fringement while acting outside of his or her official capacity, (2)
he was using "the corporation as an instrument to carry out his or
her own willful and deliberate infringements," or (3) the corpora-
tion was merely a sham allowing the officer to avoid personal li-
ability.4 Because of the complexity involved in proving that an offi-
cer was acting outside of his or her scope of employment, estab-
lishing liability was extremely difficult absent substantial under-
capitalization of the corporation 5 However, the Patent Act of 1952
broadened the definition of infringement, subjecting corporate of-
1. See Ronald B. Coolley, Personal Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors
For Infringement of Intellectual Property, 68 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 228, 229
(1986).
2. The Patent Act of 1952 is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
3. See Coolley, supra note 1, at 230.
4. See, e.g., Dangler v. Imperial Mach. Co., 11 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1926). There
was also a line of precedent based on National Cash-Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502
(1st Cir. 1899), creating liability if a corporate officer specifically authorized the in-
fringement. Dangler, 11 F.2d at 947.
5. See generally, Hitchcock v. American Plate Glass Co., 259 F. 948 (3d Cir. 1919);
Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1967).
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ficers to the risk of personal liability in situations in which tradi-
tional corporate law does not.
Among the revisions made to Title 35 of the United States Code
in The Patent Act of 1952 were two new provisions, sections
271(a) and 271(b), which would ultimately be used to hold corpo-
rate officers personally liable for patent infringement.7 Section
271(a), which defines direct infringement, establishes liability for
"who[m]ever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention."8 Section 271(b) establishes infringement
liability for "[w]ho[m]ever actively induces infringement."9 The
drafters of section 271 attempted to supply the federal courts with
a uniform definition of infringement." However, federal appellate
courts did not consistently apply the language of section 271 in
situations in which the liability of a corporate officer was at issue"
until the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") was
established in 1982.2 This comment discusses the current state of
the law regarding sections 271(a) and (b) of the Patent Act by ex-
amining only those federal court opinions published since the
creation of the CAFC. Part One focuses on direct infringement un-
der section 271(a), Part Two on inducing infringement under sec-
tion 271(b), and Part Three on the validity of the defense of good-
faith reliance on the advice of counsel as it relates to section
271(b).
6. See, e.g., White v. Mar-bel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1975); International
Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1964).
7. Section 271(a), prohibiting direct infringement, provides that "[e]xcept as other-
wise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (Supp. 11 1996). Section 271(b), prohibiting inducing infringement, provides
that "[wihoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
10. See S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402.
11. Compare International Mfg., 336 F.2d at 728-29 (applying § 271(b) to hold a cor-
porate officer personally liable for infringement), with Weller Mfg. Co. v. Wen Products,
Inc., 231 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1956) (applying traditional corporate law principles to
determine the liability of a corporate officer for infringement).
12. The Federal Circuit was added in the 1982 Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 41 incorpo-
rated in Pub.L. 97-164. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994). The CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over
all appeals from the district courts arising under any Acts of Congress relating to pat-
ents. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)(1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
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I. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
The first opportunity for the CAFC to interpret section 271(a) as
it applies to the personal liability of corporate officers for direct
infringement arose in Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs,
Inc.1 However, the Orthokinetics Court's application of section
271 was unclear at best. The alleged infringement in Orthokinetics
arose from a patent, held by Orthokinetics, Inc., which protected a
wheelchair designed for children afflicted with scoliosis.'4 Based
on the sale of similar wheelchairs by Safety Travel Chairs,
Inc.("STC"), Orthokinetics brought suit in the United States Fed-
eral District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against STC
and three of its stockholders and officers, alleging willful infringe-
ment.'5 The jury found STC's officers liable under both sections
271(a) and (b).' However, the district court granted STC's motion
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,'7 relying only on sec-
tion 271(a) and holding that a reasonable jury could not find the
officers' conduct to be willful in light of the officers' good-faith be-
lief in the patent's invalidity.'8 On appeal, the CAFC reversed, de-
termining that the willfulness of the officers' conduct was irrele-
vant to the determination of liability under section 271."
Addressing the scope of liability under section 271(a), Chief
Judge Markey, writing for the CAFC, stated that the finding of per-
sonal liability for corporate officers is conditioned upon piercing
the corporate veil.2" However, Chief Judge Markey inexplicably
failed to qualify his or her statement by discussing the traditional
requirements of piercing the corporate veil.2' Rather, he analyzed
the issue under a general agency theory.' Acknowledging that pat-
13. 806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
14. Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1568. The chair was equipped with "scoliosis pads,"
which applied pressure on the child's trunk in order to straighten the curvature in his or
her spine. Id.
15. Id. at 1569. STC and its three officers, William J. Pivacek, Clark Chipman, and
William J. Cole, answered Orthokinetics' complaint, asserting that the patents were
invalid and not infringed. Id.
16. Id. at 1578.
17. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or non obstante veredicto, is "a judgment
entered by order of court for the plaintiff (or defendant) although there has been a ver-
dict for the defendant (or plaintiff)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (6th ed. 1990).
18. Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1578.
19. Id. at 1579. The appeal was heard by a three-judge panel consisting of Chief
Judge Markey, Circuit Judge Newman, and Senior Circuit Judge Swygert. Id. at 1567.





ent infringement is a tort, the court found that a corporation's offi-
cers may be held personally liable for the torts of their corporation
"if they personally took part in the commission of the tort or spe-
cifically directed other officers, agents, or employees of the corpo-
ration to commit the tortious acts."23 Thus, the court concluded
that infringement need not be willful to create personal liability on
the part of a corporate officer pursuant to section 271(a).'
In the 1990 decision of Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys-
tems, Inc.,2 the CAFC attempted to clarify the confusion created
by its ambiguous opinion in Orthokinetics."6 At issue in Manville
Sales was a patent for an improvement to the "luminaire assembly"
used on street lights.27 The improvemefit allowed the assembly to
easily slide up and down its pole so that it could be serviced.' The
Manville Sales Corporation ("Manville") obtained a patent for the
improvement on February 5, 1973."9 In 1984, Anthony DiSimone,
the corporate secretary of Paramount Systems ("Paramount"), ob-
tained a copy of Manville's luminaire assembly design from the
Florida Department of Transportation.' DiSimone gave the design
to Paramount's president, Robert Butterworth, who had it devel-
oped into a product later sold by Paramount." Consequently, Man-
ville filed suit against Paramount, naming DiSimone and Butter-
worth as party-defendants." The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found DiSimone and Butter-
worth personally liable under both sections 271(a) and (b).' On
appeal the CAFC reversed, sharply breaking from its precedent set
forth in Orthokinetics.'
The CAFC in Manville Sales followed the Orthokinetics decision
23. Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1579.
24. Id.
25. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
26. See Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 552-53.
27. Id. at 547. The improvement was developed by Robert Zeller, a research manager
for Manville. Id.
. 28. Id. The design used "guide arms" to keep the "luminaire" centered as it moved up
and down the pole, thereby eliminating the potential for the "luminaire" to get stuck. Id.
29. Id. at 549.
30. Id.
31. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 549.
32. Id.
33. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 14 USPQ2d 1291, 1989 WL
104953 (E.D. Pa. 1989). Paramount's liability pursuant to § 271(b) is discussed infra.
34. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 552-53. The appeal was heard by a three-judge panel
consisting of Circuit Judge Archer, Circuit Judge Michel, and Circuit Judge Clevenger.
Id. at 546.
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inpart by requiring that personal liability for corporate officers be
based on sufficient "evidence to justify piercing the corporate
veil."' However, unlike the Orthokinetics decision, the Manville
Sales opinion, authored by Judge Michel, continued its analysis
under the traditional principles of corporate law and concluded
that the corporate entity cannot be disregarded unless there is a
"specific intent to escape liability for a specific tort."' This change
in direction by the CAFC was not well received by those districts
favoring the strict liability approach set forth in Orthokinetics."7 In
fact, the district courts of New Jersey and New Hampshire held
Manville Sales to be nonbinding authority, noting that Orthokinet-
ics could only be overturned by a ruling of the CAFC sitting en
banc.3
Of the two district court opinions refusing to follow Manville
Sales, the more notable is that of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey in Symbol Technologies v. Me-
trologic Instruments, Inc.' Both parties in Symbol Technologies
manufactured laser barcode scanners.' Symbol Technologies, Inc.
("Symbol") had invented a handheld laser scanner and applied for
a patent.41 At the same time, Metrologic Instruments ("Metrologic")
was developing its own version of the handheld scanner without
35. Id. at 552.
36. Id. In reaching his or her conclusion, Circuit Judge Michel acknowledged that a
corporate entity should generally be respected unless there is some specific, unusual
circumstance that requires it to be disregarded. Id.
37. See Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Metrologic Instruments, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1390
(D.C.N.J. 1991); see also, Curtis Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Plasti-Clip Corp. 888 F. Supp. 1212
(D.C.N.H. 1994).
38. See Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp. at 1404; see also Curtis, 888 F. Supp. at
1223. En ban "refers to a session where the entire membership of the court will partici-
pate in the decision rather than the regular quorum." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th
ed. 1990). The CAFC consists of twelve judges. 28 U.S.C.S. § 44 (Law. Ed. 1988). How-
ever, the court is authorized to hear cases by three judge panels. 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(b)
(West 1998). The rule cited by the Symbol Technologies and Curtis courts to support
the nonrecognition of Manville Sales states that a prior panel decision of the CAFC
cannot be overruled by a subsequent panel decision but, rather, requires a ruling from
the CAFC sitting en banc. Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp. at 1404; Curtis, 888 F.
Supp. at 1223. For this reason, the Symbol Technologies and Curtis courts argue that
Manville Sales could not overrule Orthokinetics but could only expand upon the previ-
ous decision. Id.
39. 771 F. Supp 1390 (D.C.N.J. 1991). The Curtis opinion is less worthy of discussion
because the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire relied mostly
on the language of the earlier New Jersey decision in Symbol Technologies. See Curtis,
888 F. Supp. at 1222-25.
40. Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp. at 1393.
41. Id. Symbol applied for its patent on February 10, 1986. Id.
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knowledge of Symbol's pending patent.' When the Symbol patent
was issued, Metrologic, along with at least two other companies,
was already selling a similar product.' Symbol ultimately brought
suit against Metrologic and C. Harry Knowles, Metrologic's presi-
dent and sole owner.' Metrologic conceded infringement condi-
tioned on the validity of Symbol's patent.45 However, Knowles de-
nied any personal liability for the infringement by Metrologic, rely-
ing on his or her good-faith belief in the invalidity of the Symbol
patent.4' Despite Knowles' alleged lack of intent to infringe, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Symbol, hold-
ing both Metrologic and Knowles liable.
Refusing to follow Manville Sales in its interpretation of section
271(a), the Symbol Technologies Court unequivocally stated that
"there is no need to pierce the corporate veil in order to find per-
sonal liability."' The court cited Orthokinetics as authority that a
corporate officer is personally liable for his or her torts even if the
tort is patent infringement and is committed by the officer in his or
her official capacity.' The court, however, disregarded as dicta the
CAFC's express statement in Orthokinetics that piercing the cor-
porate veil is a prerequisite to finding personal liability.' With the
Symbol Technologies Court finding seemingly valid justification
for straying so far from the Manville Sales decision, it appeared
that a new CAFC opinion clarifying the conflict between Manville
Sales and Orthokinetics would be forthcoming. However, the con-
42. Id. Metrologic developed the Model 190 scanner by 1982. Id.
43. Id. at 1393-94. When its patent was issued on June 7, 1983, Symbol began a cam-
paign of suing potentially infringing manufacturers. Id.
44. Id. at 1394. A number of events led up to Symbol's suit against Metrologic. Me-
trologic declared bankruptcy, later to emerge from bankruptcy with the design of a new
model scanner. Id. at 1393-94. In the meantime, Knowles had testified on behalf of
another laser scanner manufacturer in that manufacturer's defense against another in-
fringement suit brought by Symbol. Id.
45. Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp. at 1394.
46. Id. at 1405. Upon notification of the Symbol patent, Metrologic consulted with its
patent counsel and determined that the patent was unenforceable. Id. at 1393.
47. Id. at 1406. Summary Judgment "is a procedural device available for prompt and
expeditious disposition of controversy without trial when there is no dispute as to either
material fact or inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if only question of law
is involved." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1435 (6th ed. 1990).
48. Id. at 1402.
49. Id. at 1402-03.
50. Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp. at 1403. The district court supported its posi-
tion by noting that the Orthokinetics court not only failed to establish a foundation for
the need to pierce the corporate veil, but also based its decision on unrelated principles
of agency. Id.
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flict would remain unresolved until five years later when the CAFC
addressed the issue again in Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metal-
craft.
6 1
Hoover Group was heard by the District Court of Nebraska and
arose out of the alleged infringement of a patent protecting a stor-
age tank design.' The district court relied on Orthokinetics and
held, Dwayne Holden, president, chief executive officer, and prin-
cipal shareholder of Custom Metalcraft, Inc., personally liable for
Custom Metalcraft's infringement.' The CAFC reversed the district
court's holding, thereby supporting the Manville Sales Court's in-
terpretation of both sections 271(a) and (b).'
The Hoover Group Court acknowledged the principle upon
which the argument in Symbol Technologies was founded-that
the general tort liability of corporate officers does not depend on
the ability of the plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil.' However,
the CAFC expanded upon the general rule by distinguishing be-
tween liability for "commercial torts con~unitted in the course of
the officer's employment, and negligent and other culpable wrong-
ful acts."' Writing for the court, Judge Newman noted that when a
corporate officer commits a tort in which he or she has no per-
sonal interest, the officer has historically been protected by the
corporate structure. 7 Because a corporate officer has no personal
interest in patent infringement the court determined that patent
infringement is in the nature of a commercial tort.' The court,
51. 84 F.3d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The appeal by Hoover Group was heard by a three
judge panel of the CAFC, consisting of Chief Judge Archer, Circuit Judge Newman, and
Circuit Judge Clevenger. Id. Circuit Judge Pauline Newman wrote the opinion for the
court. Id.
52. Hoover Group, 84 F.3d at 1409-10. Both Hoover Group and Custom Metalcraft
made tanks for storage and transportation. Id.
53. Id. at 1411.
54. Id. at 1412. The Hoover Group Court's interpretations of § 271(b) are discussed
infra.
55. Id. at 1411. The CAFC started down another misleading path in the beginning of
its analysis when it stated that the Orthokinetics Court found liability by applying the
principles of piercing the corporate veil. Id.
56. Id. at 1411. The court explained that the nature of the wrong is taken into consid-
eration and gave conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and malicious prosecution
as examples of torts for which corporate officers have been subject to personal liability
and interference with contractual relations as an example of a commercial tort for
which corporate officers are protected by the corporate veil. Id.
57. Hoover Group, 84 F.3d at 1411.
58. Id. at 1411-12. The criteria used by the court to distinguish a commercial tort
from other torts were the nature of the wrong, the culpability of the act, and the actions




therefore, concluded that the commission of the tort of infringe-
ment by a corporate officer, acting within the scope of his or her
duties, does not, in and of itself, subject the officer to personal li-
ability, but only justifies personal liability if there is sufficient
cause to pierce the corporate veil.59
In Hoover Group the CAFC clarified the uncertainties which for
so long had surrounded the application of section 271(a) to corpo-
rate officers. If Hoover Group is accepted by the district courts, an
officer of a valid corporation may once again feel secure in per-
forming his or her official duties without the threat of incurring
liability for direct infringement.' However, even if liability for di-
rect infringement is now unlikely, the danger of personal liability
for patent infringement remains. A corporate officer still faces the
risk of liability for inducing infringement under section 271(b).
II. INDUCING INFRINGEMENT
A year before the CAFC first addressed direct infringement in
Orthokinetics, the court heard Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools,6 in
which it was asked to determine the liability of a corporate officer
for inducing infringement under section 271(b).62 The dispute in
Power Lift arose when Lang Tools, under the direction of its
president and founding director, Wendell Lang, reverse engineered
an invention manufactured by Power Lift, Inc.' The invention was
a system designed to lift equipment from the mouth of an oil or gas
well so that the well could be serviced.' At the time Lang Tools
copied the lift system design it was unaware that Power Lift had
already filed a patent application.' After the patent had been is-
59. Id.
60. Hoover Group was not decided by the court en banc. Hoover Group, 84 F.3d at
1409. Therefore, even though Hoover Group gives a far more definitive interpretation of
§ 271(a) than that given in Manville Sales, it is possible that the a district court could
consider it nonbinding authority.
61. 774 F.2d 478 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
62. Power Lift, 774 F.2d at 478. The appeal by Lang Tools was heard by a three-judge
panel of the CAFC consisting of Circuit Judge Rich, Circuit Judge Bennett, and Senior
Circuit Judge Miller. Id. at 479.
63. Id. Wendell Lang's son, Darrell, was seen taking measurements of the Power Lift
invention. Id at 481. The machine ultimately produced by Lang Tools was based on the
Power Lift invention but was not an exact copy. Id.
64. Id. at 480. Equipment that rests on the mouth of an oil or gas well drilling rig
sometimes needs to be lifted so that the well bore casing can be serviced. Id.
65. Id. at 481. Power Lift filed a patent application on July 14, 1980, and Lang Tools
finished its copy of the invention before November 1980. Id. However, the only claim in
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sued, Power Lift contacted Wendell Lang and offered Lang Tools a
license on the newly patented lift system, alleging that Lang Tools
was infringing.' Wendell Lang declined the license and refused to
stop production. 7 Power Lift then brought an action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma naming
both Lang Tools and Wendell Lang as defendants.' The action in-
stituted against Wendell Lang was based solely on Lang's alleged
violation of section 271(b); Power Lift claimed that Wendell Lang
induced Lang Tools to infringe the Power Lift patent.' Wendell
Lang defended by arguing that "a corporation, which can act only
through its officers and agents, cannot be said to have been 'in-
duced' by its officers to do certain acts."" When a verdict was re-
turned in favor of Power Lift, Wendell Lang appealed the decision
to the CAFC.
71
The CAFC followed the Fifth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth
Circuit, broadly interpreting section 271(b) to "include liability of
corporate officials who actively aid and abet their corporation's
infringement."72 This broad reading of section 271(b) established a
precedent that diverged from the traditional principles of corpo-
rate law and held corporate officers personally accountable for
their official conduct. The Power Lift court failed, however, to an-
swer one important question which has yet to be completely re-
solved-the necessary degree of culpability.
Having established in Power Lift that section 271(b) applies to
corporate officers, the CAFC began its quest to define the elements
of such a charge in Water Technologies Corp. v. Gartner.3 The
infringing invention involved in Water Technologies was a drinldng
straw coated with a bactericidal resin used to purify water. 4 Dur-
the Power Lift patent potentially effecting the Lang Tools machine was added in an
amendment to the application in April, 1981. Id. at 481-82.
66. Id. at 482. Power Lift offered the license to Lang immediately upon issuance of
the patent on December 15, 1981, and Lang responded by saying that "before he would
pay [Power Lift] a nickel, he'd see [Power Lift] in the courthouse." Id.
67. Power Lift, 774 F.2d at 482.
68. Id. at 479, 482.
69. Id. at 480. Power Lift made no allegation that Wendell Lang directly infringed the
patent under § 271(a). Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 479.
72. Power Lift, 774 F.2d at 481.
73. 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
74. Water Technologies, 850 F.2d at 663-64. Before the development of bactericidal
resins for use in purifying water, the technique most often used to disinfect water was to
insert halogen tablets directly into the water. Id. at 663. This technique left a residue of
1998
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ing his or her invention of the purifying straw, William Gartner, the
president of a chemical laboratory, had attempted to sidestep in-
fringement by making slight modifications to the resin used in a
preexisting process patent for which Water Technologies Corpora-
tion ("WTC") held an exclusive license.75 After learning of the simi-
larities, WTC brought suit against both the manufacturer of the
straw for direct infringement76 and William Gartner for inducing
infringement." The United States District Court for the Northern
District of minois held the manufacturer liable for direct infringe-
ment and William Gartner liable for inducing infringement.8 On
appeal, the CAFC upheld the ruling of the district court.9
With respect to the issue of inducing infringement, the Water
Technologies Court focused on the knowledge of the corporate
officer.' Judge Nies, writing for the CAFC, narrowly interpreted
section 271(b) by concluding that "a person infinges by actively
and knowingly aiding and abetting another's direct infringement.""1
After finding intent to be an essential element of inducing in-
fringement, the court then turned its attention to the proof of such
intent.' Because Gartner had taken no bona fide steps to deter-
mine whether his or her invention was or was not infringing, the
disinfectant in the water, which resulted in unpleasant-tasting drinking water and could
be harmful to the eyes if used in swimming pools. Id.
75. Id. at 664. WTC held an exclusive license to manufacture purifying products from
a disinfecting resin patented by Dr. Gary L. Hatch and assigned to Aqua-Chem, Inc. Id.
at 663. Under it exclusive license WTC manufactured a water purifying cup. Id. While
making his or her purifying straw, Gartner added a small amount of potassium bromide
to Dr. Hatch's resin formula because he believed that the addition would avoid infringe-
ment. Id at 664.
76. Id. at 664. Gartner granted Calco, Ltd. a license to manufacture and sell the puri-
fying drinking straw. Id. at 663
77. Id. WTC, as licensee, petitioned Aqua-Chem to bring an action challenging the
Gartner patent. Id. When Aqua-Chem declined to file an infringement action, WTC
brought the foregoing action as an exclusive licensee. Id.
78. Id. See also, Water Technologies Corporation v. Gartner, 658 F. Supp. 961 (N.D.
111. 1986). The district court also found both Calco and Gartner liable for unfair competi-
tion. Water Technologies, 850 F.2d at 664.
79. Water Technologies, 850 F.2d at 662. The CAFC affirmed the district court's rul-
ing as it pertained to the direct infringement by Calco and induced infringement by
Gartner but reversed on the issue of unfair competition. Id. The case before the CAFC
was decided by a three-judge panel consisting of Circuit Judge Nies, Circuit Judge
Archer, and Senior Circuit Judge Skelton. Id.
80. Id. at 668-69.
81. Id. at 668. Circuit Judge Nies noted that § 271(b) does not use the word "know-
ing" but concluded that the "knowing" requirement was required by the existing case law
and legislative history. Id.
82. Id. The court concluded that the intent required under § 271(b) could be proven
by circumstantial evidence. Id.
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CAFC held that the lower court did not err in concluding that his
or her infringement was intentional.'
Two years after Water Technologies, the CAFC revisited the is-
sue of a corporate officer's personal liability for inducing infringe-
ment in Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.," and
once again limited the scope of section 271(b).' Citing Water
Technologies, the Manville Sales Court acknowledged that liability
under section 271(b) requires the alleged infringer "to have know-
ingly induced infringement."' The court then went a step farther,
by holding that section 271(b) requires more than mere knowledge
on the part of the corporate officer; it also requires the officer to
have "possessed [the] specific intent to encourage another's in-
fringement."87 Manville Sales, thus, removed any doubt that might
have remained after Water Technologies as to whether inducing
infringement constitutes an intentional tort according to the CACF.
However, those lower courts favoring a strict liability theory for
patent infringement were no more willing to accept the CAFC's
conclusions as to section 271(b) than they had been as to section
271(a).8
In Symbol Technologies, the defendant corporate officer argued
to the district court that he could not have had the intent to induce
infringement as required by Manville Sales because he had acted
upon the advice of his or her corporation's counsel.' However,
refusing to acknowledge the Manville Sales holding for the same
reasons it had concerning direct infringement, the district court
explicitly rejected the argument that intent is an element of the tort
of inducing infringement.' Instead, the court relied on a liberalized
form of the knowledge requirement set forth in Water Technolo-
83. Id. at 668-69. The court suggested that if Gartner had sought the advice of coun-
sel, he might have been protected. Id. at 669.
84. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The portion of the Manville Sales opinion relating
to direct infringement was discussed supra.
85. See Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 553-54.
86. Id. at 553.
87. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of proving (1) that the actions of the defendant
induced infringement and (2) that the defendant "knew or should have known his or her
actions would induce actual infringements." Id.
88. See Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp. at 1402-06; see also Curtis, 888 F. Supp. at
1222-25.
89. See Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp. at 1405. The validity of the defense of
good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel is discussed infra.
90. Id. Judge Brotman stated that the corporate officer's reliance on the advice of
counsel is only relevant in determining if the infringement was willful for the purpose of
finding increased damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284. Id.
1998
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gies, and concluded that to find a corporate officer liable for induc-
ing infringement, it need only be shown that the officer had some
knowledge of an infringement controversy.9"
The district court's decision in Symbol Technologies clearly in-
dicated the CAFC needed to set consistent standards regarding
corporate officer liability under section 271(b). The CAFC ad-
dressed the issue in Hoover Group but with much less clarity and
depth than it had regarding direct infringement.' The Hoover
Group Court, quoting its previous decisions, simply established
that a plaintiff alleging section 271(b) liability against a corporate
officer must prove something more than mere "knowledge" and
something less than the existence of a sham corporation.93 Al-
though the court both alluded to an element of intent and noted
the district court's failure to find intent, it failed to expressly state
that intent is a requirement under section 271(b).' Because Hoover
Group was not decided by the court sitting en banc, the suggestion
that intent is a required element of section 271(b) is just as likely to
be ignored by the lower courts as was the Manville Sales opinion.
Therefore, the CAFC may again be presented with the issues sur-
rounding the application of section 271(b) to corporate officers.
One such issue that appears likely to arise is a corporate officer's
ability to raise the defense of good-faith reliance on the advice of
counsel when charged with inducing infringement.
LII. GOOD-FAITH RELIANCE ON THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL
Whether a corporate officer may use his or her good-faith reli-
ance on the advice of counsel as a defense to a charge of inducing
infringement turns on the intent requirement of section 271(b).
Reliance on the advice of counsel may be used to disprove intent
and may, therefore, be a defense to intentional misconduct.5 How-
91. See Id. at 1404. The court stated that "knowledge," as the term was used by the
Water Technologies Court, is not synonymous with an intent to infringe but, rather,
means that the corporate officer is aware that there is an issue as to infringement. Id.
The court then quoted the Orthokinetics Court's holding that "[clorporate officers are
presumably aware of what they are doing, and in that sense can be said to have acted
willfully." Id at 1405.
92. See Hoover Group, 84 F.3d at 1411-12.
93. See Id. at 1412. That portion of the Hoover Group opinion regarding § 271(b) was
simply a string of quotations from the court's previous decisions. See Id.
94. See Id. An intent requirement is suggested by the court's quotation of the "knowl-
edge" requirements set forth in Water Technologies and Manville Sales. Id.
95. See generally United States v. Defries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Ped-
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ever, the general rule is that the advice of counsel is not an abso-
lute defense to negligent or unlawful acts.9'6 Therefore, if inducing
infringement is an intentional tort, the defense is clearly valid.
However, if section 271(b) requires something less than an intent
to induce infringement, the effect of the advice of counsel upon
one's liability is less apparent. Therefore, the viability of the good-
faith reliance defense in the context of inducing infringement de-
pends upon whether intent is a required element of a section
271(b) violation.
The opinions in Manville Sales and Symbol Technologies are
diametrically opposed on the issue of whether section 271(b) re-
quires that a defendant be shown to have intentionally induced
infringement.97 The CAFC in Manville Sales stated that "it must be
established that the defendant possessed specific intent to encour-
age another's infringement[.]"' The Symbol Technologies Court
held that "specific intent to infringe is not necessary for a finding
of inducing infringement."' It was expected that this conflict
would be put to rest by the CAFC in Hoover Group, and, at first
glance, this would seem to be the case."° However, a close reading
of Hoover Group reveals an open invitation for further dispute.
Reduced to its essence, Hoover Group asserts nothing more
than a requirement that a corporate officer's liability for inducing
infringement be "supported by personal culpability," where "per-
sonal culpability" is defined as "actively and knowingly assist[ing]
with the corporation's infringement."'' With this definition, the
court seems to have linked the required culpability to the knowl-
edge of the officer. However, the court did not define what degree
of knowledge it envisions."°n This leads back to the argument made
in Symbol Technologies-that the term "knowledge" does not re-
quire that a corporate officer knows that he or she is infringing
rina v. Chun, 906 F. Supp. 1377, 1422-23 (D. Haw. 1995); United States v. Faust, 850 F.2d
575, 583 (9th Cir. 1988); Rea v. Witchita Mortgage Corp., 747 F.2d 567, 576 (10th Cir.
1984).
96. In re Valdelinde, 366 S.E.2d 631, 637 (W. Va. 1988).
97. Compare, Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 553, with Symbol Technologies, 771 F.
Supp. at 1405.
98. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 553.
99. Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp at 1405.
100. Hoover Group, 84 F.3d at 1412. It is easy to construe (or maybe misconstrue) the
Hoover Group Court's discussion of the officer's culpability and knowledge to indicate a









Premising its argument on its broad definition of "knowledge,"
the Symbol Technologies Court posited that no intent to infringe is
required under section 271(b). °" Without the requirement of intent,
the court was able to conclude that the defense of good-faith reli-
ance on the advice of counsel is invalid when applied to a charge
of inducing infringement.' 5 This argument is no less sound now
than it was when made by the Symbol Technologies Court. There-
fore, the CAFC may have failed in Hoover Group to protect corpo-
rate officers in those districts favoring a strict liability theory.
CONCLUSION
Corporate officers need to be able to make decisions based on
the opinions of corporate counsel, without having to be concerned
that a rogue district court will find them strictly liable for patent
infringement. Patents are not meant to create monopolies; they are
instead intended as an incentive for research and development.
With corporations carrying the bulk of the modem world's re-
search and development, dismantling the corporate structure
through the language of the Patent Act defeats the very principle
upon which that act was founded. If a corporate officer is truly
culpable in an infringement, a liberal interpretation of section 271
is not necessary to provide an adequate remedy. If strict liability is
read into the language of section 271, the only effect is to limit a
corporation's ability to enter areas of development where the po-
tential for an infringement controversy is uncertain. The purpose
of allowing limited liability for the officers of a corporation is to
enable the officers to take such calculated risks. However, if a
corporate officer is unable to make decisions based on the advice
of corporate counsel without chancing personal liability, the foun-
dation of the corporate structure is destroyed. It is inconceivable
that the drafters of the Patent Act intended such a result.
Joseph M. Sauer
103. Symbol Technologies, 771 F. Supp at 1404.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1405.
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